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A UNIFORM LAW OF MARRIAGE? THE 1868 ROYAL COMMISSION 
RECONSIDERED 
Rebecca Probert, Maebh Harding and Brian Dempsey* 
 
2018 marks the 150th anniversary of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws 
of Marriage and its attempt to create a single law of marriage that would apply to 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland.1 Despite the conclusion of the Commission that 
such uniformity was highly desirable, and that it was ‘the duty of the State to make an 
earnest endeavour to overcome’2 any barriers to achieving it, only limited reforms were 
enacted. Today, the differences between the laws of marriage in the United Kingdom 
and the now Republic of Ireland are greater than ever. In terms of the formalities 
required for a valid marriage, the law in England and Wales has remained structurally 
the same as it was 150 years ago while the laws of Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the 
Republic of Ireland have changed more radically. With demands for marriage reform 
in England and Wales gathering pace, and proponents of reform looking to other parts 
of Britain and Ireland for inspiration, it is enlightening to look back at what was 
proposed in 1868, and why it failed to become law. 
The first part of the article accordingly sketches out the marriage laws of England and 
Wales, Ireland, and Scotland at the time the Royal Commission began its deliberations 
and discusses the case that had exposed the differences between them and generated a 
new desire for uniformity. The second part considers the constitution of the 
Commission and analyses its recommendations. The third looks at the relatively limited 
reforms that were enacted in response to the Report, and the fourth considers the longer-
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1 The constitutional relationship between them had evolved over the centuries, with Wales being 
annexed to England in 1536, and the crowns of Scotland and England being united under James VI 
(who accordingly became James VI of Scotland and James I of England and Wales) in 1603. The Act 
of Union in 1707 (5&6 Anne, c 11) created the Kingdom of Great Britain, encompassing England, 
Wales, and Scotland, and a further Act of Union in 1800 (39 & 40 Geo III, c 67) created the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. See J Snape and R Probert, ‘Introduction’ in R Probert and J 
Snape (eds) A Cultural History of Law in the Age of Enlightenment (Bloomsbury, 2018).  
2 Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage (London 1868), Cm 4059, xxiv (hereafter 
Report). 
term impact of the Commission in terms of its assumptions about the principles that 
should underpin the law of marriage.   
 
EXPOSING THE DISPARITIES IN MARRIAGE LAW 
In the 1860s, there were fundamental differences in the way that marriages were 
regulated across Great Britain and Ireland. In both England and Wales, and in Ireland, 
there was increasing state intervention through legislation and the marriage laws had 
been relatively recently reformed. By contrast, the picture in Scotland was 
predominantly one of failure to extend state control over marriage formation.3 
 
England and Wales 
 
In England and Wales, the Clandestine Marriages Act of 1753 had enshrined the 
requirements of the canon law in statute, albeit with a new and harsher penalties for 
those who failed to comply with certain key requirements. All except Quakers and Jews 
were expected to marry according to the rites of the Church of England. With the 
growth of Nonconformity in the nineteenth century this requirement began to seem 
irksome on both sides and the 1830s had seen a sustained campaign by Nonconformists 
for the right to solemnise marriages.4 This coincided with a new interest on the part of 
the state in ensuring better recording of key demographic events, and with a new 
administrative machinery that would be able to implement it. Reforms to the Poor Law 
had divided the country into a number of civil districts that could be used as the basis 
for a new system. The resulting Marriage Act of 18365 introduced the possibility of 
civil marriage, brought Jewish and Quaker marriages within a formal legal structure, 
and provided for the possibility of other non-Anglicans marrying according to their own 
                                                        
3 The history of marriage formation in Scotland is far from complete but for recent studies see E 
Gordon, ‘Irregular Marriage: Myth and Reality’ (2013) 47 Journal of Social History 507; TM Green 
(ed) The Consistorial Decisions of the Commissaries of Edinburgh 1564 to 1576/7 (Stair Society, vol 
61, 2014); B Dempsey ‘Making the Gretna blacksmith redundant: who worried, who spoke, who was 
heard on the abolition of irregular marriage in Scotland?’ (2009) 30 Journal of Legal History 23; B 
Dempsey, ‘The Marriage (Scotland) Bill 1755’ in H MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI (The Stair Society, 
vol 54, 2009). 
4 See R Probert, Marriage Law and Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century: A Reassessment (CUP 
2009), ch 9. 
5 6 & 7 Will IV c 85.  
religious rites. Such was the diversity of dissent in this period, though, that simply 
devolving the power to conduct marriages to other religious groups was not really an 
option.6 There were many different groups of Methodists, Baptists, and Independents, 
and no single overarching organization that could speak for them.7 There were also 
many lay preachers within Nonconformist organisations, so making the validity of a 
marriage dependent upon who had conducted it would have been problematic. The 
compromise was to license individual buildings that were used as places of worship: if 
twenty householders confirmed that they used a particular building as their regular 
place of worship, it would be registered as a place where marriages could be 
celebrated.8  
At the same time as creating greater choice, the 1836 Act also extended the power of 
the state in a number of respects. Authority was conferred upon a state official – the 
superintendent registrar – to celebrate civil marriages.9 All those marrying other than 
according to non-Anglican rites, including Jews and Quakers, had to give notice to the 
superintendent registrar. 10  There was even an attempt to introduce universal civil 
preliminaries, but this was strongly resisted by the Church of England and banns and 
licences were retained as legal preliminaries to the Anglican service. State control was 
further asserted by stipulating that all marriages should be centrally registered; 11 
responsibility for registration was devolved in the case of Anglican, Jewish, and Quaker 
marriages, but all other marriages, whether civil or religious, had to be attended by a 
civil registrar.12 
The take-up of these new options was relatively slow. In 1838, the first full year of the 
new Act’s operation, just 1,257 places of worship had been registered for the 
                                                        
6 While the special treatment of Quaker and Jewish weddings was to some extent a matter of historical 
accident (see Probert, n 4 above), its continuance may well have been influenced by the fact that the 
groups in question were relatively small and had a distinct identity. 
7 A Gilbert, Religion and Society in Industrial England: Church, Chapel and Social Change, 1740-
1914 (Longman, 1976); R Currie, A Gilbert and L Horsley, Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of 
Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700 (Clarendon Press, 1997); D Rosman, The Evolution of 
the English Churches, 1500-2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
8 Marriage Act 1836, s 18. 
9 Marriage Act 1836, s 21. 
10 Marriage Act 1836, s 4. 
11 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1836, 6 & & Will IV, c 86. 
12 Marriage Act 1836, s 20. 
celebration of marriage. 13  Independents accounted for the biggest single group, with 
547 chapels, followed by Baptists with 246 and Roman Catholics with 197. The 
Unitarians had 73, Presbyterians 36 and the Moravians just one. That year fewer than 
3,000 couples married in a non-Anglican religious ceremony, and 1,093 couples – just 
over 1 per cent of the total – in a civil ceremony.14  
It is possible that the association with the Poor Law was off-putting to many. Notices 
of marriage had to read out at meetings of Poor Law Guardians. Discontent with this 
procedure led to a minor change in 1856: notices of marriage were no longer to be read 
out at such meetings but simply posted up outside the local register office.15 Yet the 
change did not lead to any sudden surge in popularity. By 1865, the number marrying 
outside the Established Church had grown to over 40,000, but this was still only 22 per 
cent of the total.16 Roman Catholic marriages accounted for around 5 per cent, while 
Jewish and Quaker marriages barely registered in statistical terms, with just 353 and 54 
respectively. Civil marriages still only accounted for 8 per cent, outnumbered by 
marriages in dissenting chapels. Even so, the number of marriages in dissenting chapels 
was relatively small, both in proportion to the number of places registered for marriage 
and the number of dissenting places of worship more generally. With 5,352 places of 
worship registered for marriage, it worked out at around 3 per chapel per year.  In 
evaluating the relatively low uptake of both civil marriage and marriage according to 
non-Anglican religious rites, 17  it should perhaps be borne in mind that marriage 
according to Anglican rites was the only route to a legally binding marriage that did not 
entail direct contact with the state.  
Ireland 
In Ireland, too, state control over marriage was extended by means of formal legislation 
over the course of the nineteenth century. In particular, the Marriages (Ireland) Act 
1844 had been modelled on the 1836 Act, introducing the option of civil marriage and 
                                                        
13 First Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England (HMSO, 
1839), 6. 
14 Ibid, 17. 
15 Marriage and Registration Act 1856, 19 & 20 Vict, c 119, s 4.  
16 Twenty-eighth Annual Report of the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths, and Marriages in England, 
1865 (HMSO, 1867), iii. 
17 For discussion see O Anderson, ‘The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian England and Wales’ 
(1975) 69 Past & Present 50; R Floud and P Thane, ‘The Incidence of Civil Marriage in Victorian 
England and Wales’ (1979) 84 Past & Present 146. 
a new (but limited) system of civil registration, as well as regulating religious marriages 
more closely. However, in contrast to England and Wales, the vast majority of 
marriages in Ireland were Catholic marriages, which remained nearly entirely 
unregulated by the state until the mid-1990s when a universal notice requirement was 
imposed.18 Moreover, the association of 18th century marriage legislation with anti-
Catholic provisions led to an identification of state marriage law with the interests of 
the Established Church and a policy of Catholic suppression.19 At the time of the Royal 
Commission, Ireland effectively had two regulatory systems for entry into marriage 
jostling for primacy, that of the Catholic Church for the Catholic majority and that of 
1844 Act for the Protestant land-owning minority. The way in which people married in 
Ireland reinforced their sectarian cultural identity as Protestant or Catholic.  
Eighteenth century legislation, designed to prevent the assimilation of Protestant 
English settlors with the native Irish Catholic population, recognised the validity of 
‘mixed marriages’ ie marriages between a Protestant and a Catholic, only if such 
marriages had been carried out by a clergyman of the Established Church.20 Mixed 
marriages carried out by Roman Catholic priests were void ab initio.21  Moreover, 
Roman Catholic priests who carried out ‘mixed marriages’ or tried to marry two 
members of the Established Church were subject to excessive penalties,22  leading 
Catholic emancipation campaigner, Daniel O’Connell to suggest that in 1830 such 
priests could be ‘hanged first and fined later’.23  At this time, Irish MPs encountered 
considerable resistance to removing such criminal penalties as it was feared that such 
                                                        
18 Family Law Act 1995, s 32(1)(a) (Ir).  
19 J Kelly ‘The historiography of the Penal Laws’ in J Bergin et al (eds), New Perspectives on the Penal 
Laws (Eighteenth Century Ireland Society, 2011). 
20 32 Geo III, c 21 (Ir) s 9, s 12.  
21 19 Geo II, c 13 (Ir); reiterated by 23 Geo II, c 10 (Ir) s 3. Considered in Steadman v Powell (1822) 1 
Add 58; 162 ER 21 (Prerogative Court of Canterbury); Bruce v Burke (1825) 2 Add 471; 162 ER 367 
(Court of Arches); O'Connor v M'Cann (1829) Milward 204 (Prerogative Court); In Re Darcy’s Infants 
(1860) 11 ICLR 298; Swifte v Swifte [1910] 2 IR 140. 
22 12 Geo I, c 3 (Ir), s 1 stated that when carried out by a Popish priest, reputed Popish Priest, person 
pretending to be a Popish priest or a clergyman of the Church of Ireland or any degraded clergyman 
such marriage were felonies and the celebrant was punishable by death. The death penalty was 
reiterated in 23 Geo II, c 10 (Ir), s 3. 33 George III c 21 (Ir), s 1, imposed a penalty of £500 but left the 
existing death penalty for such marriages untouched. An unreported decision of the Irish Kings Bench, 
later referred to by O’Connell (Hansard, HC Deb, vol 18, col 1240 (26 June 1833)), apparently 
interpreted the penalties as cumulative. Unfortunately, law reports for the Irish Kings Bench simply do 
not exist for this period to verify his claim. Official reports only start in 1866 and the nominate reports 
are very patchy before then (EG Hall, The Superior Courts of Law: ‘Official’ Law Reporting in Ireland 
1866–2006 (Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for Ireland, 2007), 610-3 gives a comprehensive 
list).  
23 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 24, col 398 (4 May 1830). 
change would give Roman Catholic priests impunity to celebrate clandestine marriages, 
which would be unfavourable to the Protestant community in Ireland.24 The Marriages 
by Roman Catholics (Ireland) Act 183325 finally repealed all penalties affecting Roman 
Catholic clergyman who celebrated the marriage of a Protestant or reputed Protestant. 
However, in spite of the best attempts of Catholic emancipators in the 1830s who 
highlighted the plight of Catholic women seduced by Protestant men and then 
deserted,26 mixed marriages by Catholic priests remained legally invalid.27  The vexed 
issue of ‘mixed marriages’ continued to dominate political discourse about Irish 
marriage regulation throughout the 19th century and would, in due course, prove one of 
the points of contention in the high-profile Yelverton case.28 
The Irish legislation passed in 1844 differed from the English 1836 Act in several key 
respects. The primary trigger for the legislation was the legal uncertainty of marriages 
of members of the Established Church carried out by Presbyterians. While marriages 
celebrated by Presbyterian ministers had been recognised since the late eighteenth 
century, as long as the marriage was celebrated between two Protestant dissenters,29 
there was no legislative provision as to the validity of marriages where one party was 
not a Protestant dissenter.30 From the 1830s onwards, the legal invalidity of a marriage 
celebrated by a Presbyterian was increasingly raised in Assizes as a defence to bigamy 
charges,31 culminating in the case of R v Millis32 where the requirement for marriages 
in England and Ireland to be carried out by ‘a priest in holy orders’33 in order to be 
                                                        
24 All reforming Bills were opposed on the basis that punishment of Catholic priests provided the only 
remaining security for the Protestants of Ireland against clandestine marriage: see eg Hansard, HC 
Deb, vol 33, col 828 (11 May 1836); Roman Catholic Marriage Bill, HC Deb, vol 28, col 859 (17 June 
1835). 
25 3 &4 William IV c 102.  
26 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 28, cols 859-60 (17 June 1835); HL Deb, vol 30, col 245 (11 August 1835). 
27 See below.  
28 See below. 
29 21 & 22 Geo III c 25 (Ir). 
30 32 Geo III, c 21 (Ir), ss 12, 13 made it particularly unclear whether Dissenters were permitted to 
celebrate mixed marriages between a Protestant and a Roman Catholic. 
31 See, eg R v McLaughlin (1831) 1 Crawford & Dix 170; Mc Anerney’s Case (1841) Irish Circuit 
Reports 287; Samuel Smith’s Case (1841) Crawford & Dix 287; 
32 R v Millis (1843-44) 10 Cl & F 534; 8 ER 844, in which George Millis was acquitted of bigamy, his 
first marriage having been conducted by a Presbyterian minister in Ireland despite the fact that George 
was a member of the Established Church of Ireland and the second according to the rites of the Church 
of England. See further R Probert, ‘R v Millis reconsidered: binding contracts and bigamous marriages’ 
(2008) 28 Legal Studies 337; M Harding, ‘The Comeback of the Medieval Marriage per verba de 
praesenti in Nineteenth Century Bigamy Cases’ in N Howlin and K Costello (eds), Law and Family in 
Ireland 1800-1950  (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017). 
33 Which included a clergyman of the Established Church and a Roman Catholic Priest but not a 
Protestant Dissenter or Presbyterian.  
recognised at common law was established. Throughout the early 19th century, the 
Presbyterian community in Ireland repeatedly lobbied Parliament for legislation 
declaring their marriages to be legally valid.34 As a result, the 1844 Act recognised 
Presbyterian marriages as a specific category of religious marriages, alongside those in 
the Established Church and those conducted according to Quaker or Jewish rites. 
Moreover, while the Act permitted both the Established Church and Presbyterians to 
use their own religious preliminaries as an alternative to giving notice to a state 
registrar, only the Presbyterians could insist on religious preliminaries as they were not 
required by the Act to accept the civil certificate of notice as a valid preliminary to 
marriage.35 
Catholic marriages remained outside the legal framework of the 1844 Act.36 Although 
the internal marriage practices of the Catholic Church became more consistent and fell 
into line with the requirements of canon law after 1850, Archbishop Cullen objected to 
any contact with the structures of the Protestant state, particularly those of the Poor 
Law.37 Between 1860 and 1863, eight Bills to extend state marriage registration to 
Catholic marriages were unsuccessful. 38  It was not until 1863 that legislation 
introduced by William Monsell, a future Royal Commissioner, with the prior approval 
of Archbishop Cullen,39 required couples marrying in a Catholic ceremony to obtain a 
civil certificate of notice in advance of the wedding and for the completed certificate to 
be registered by them on pain of a fine. 40   
The 1844 Act also allowed members of other religious denominations to marry 
according to their own rites in buildings registered for the purpose, although a state 
registrar had to be in attendance.41 The Marriage Law (Amendment) Act 1863 later 
allowed marriages to be ‘celebrated or solemnised’ by ministers of ‘Protestant 
                                                        
34 See eg Hansard, HC Deb, vol 60, col 99 (7 February 1842); HL Deb, vol 60, cols 315-6 (14 
February 1842). 
35 Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844, s 4 and s 13 limited the preliminaries to ordinary licence and banns 
only. 
36 Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844, s 3. 
37 ER Norman, The Catholic Church in Ireland and the Age of Rebellion 1859-1873 (Longmans, 1965), 
73-74. 
38 Outlined by Robert Peel: Hansard, HC Deb, vol 169, cols 547-56 (19 February 1863). 
39 Who later issued a pastoral urging compliance with the system: JA Robins ‘The background to the 
first Irish Registration Acts’ (1963) 11 Administration 282. 
40 Registration of Marriages (Ireland) Act 1863 26 & 27 Vict, c 90, s 11 imposed a £10 fine on the 
husband for non-compliance. 
41 Marriages (Ireland) Act 1844, ss 27-28. 
Christian’ bodies according to the usages of the body without the need for a registrar in 
attendance, some three decades before this requirement was lifted in England.42   
Scotland 
Despite the union of England and Wales with Scotland in 1707, both countries retained 
their own, quite distinctive private law. At the start of the nineteenth century, there were 
two routes to becoming married in Scotland, either by a regular or by an irregular 
process.  Regular marriages were those celebrated before a minister of the 
(presbyterian) Church of Scotland after banns had been called or, somewhat 
exceptionally, by a priest of the Scottish Episcopalian Church.43 
Irregular marriage has its roots in the medieval canon law of the Catholic Church.  
Although the Church, and later the state, frowned upon and indeed punished those who 
entered an irregular marriage, the view that it was the free interchange of consent to 
marriage that formed marriage between the parties meant that formalities were not 
required for the marriage to be valid.  The three forms of irregular marriage were 
marriage by present consent to marriage (declaration per verba de praesenti), by 
promise of future marriage followed by sexual intercourse (per verba de futuro 
subsequente copula) and by cohabitation with habit and repute.44  While there remains 
a lack of clarity over whether these were forms of irregular marriage, rather than merely 
the three permissible ways of proving the parties’ intentions, there is no doubt but that, 
if proved, then the parties were just as married as if they had undergone all the 
requirements of regular marriage.45   
One reason, perhaps the main reason, that Scots’ retention of pre-Reformation irregular 
marriage was controversial was the possibility of English ‘runaway’ brides and grooms 
crossing the border and marrying in a manner that was unavailable to them in England. 
                                                        
42 On which see R Probert, ‘A Uniform Marriage Law for England and Wales?’ [2018] CFLQ 
(forthcoming). 
43 The Toleration Act 1711, 10 Ann c 6. 
44 See E Clive The law of husband and wife in Scotland (Green,1st ed 1974), 107-122 and J 
Fergusson, A Treatise on the Present State of the Consistorial Law in Scotland (Bell & Bradfute, 
1829), 112-116.   
45 J Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair, The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (2nd revised edition) (Heir of 
Andrew Anderson 1693, reprinted 1981), I IV 6. 
As Scots law required neither parental consent46 nor any period of residence for the 
formation of marriage de praesenti and English law recognised marriages of its subjects 
if valid by the lex loci celebrationis (the place of celebration),47 English couples with 
the means to travel could enter into a legally binding irregular marriage in Scotland 
which, if proved, would be recognised by the law of England.48   
Attempts were made in 1755 and again between 1847 and 1849 to abolish irregular 
marriage in Scotland.  The first, an attempt by Lord Hardwicke to impose the terms of 
his 1753 Act upon Scotland, failed, largely due to political happenstance.49 The failure 
of the various bills in the late 1840s appears to be due to two related factors. The first 
was that each of the marriage bills was linked to a separate bill that sought to establish 
the office of Registrar in Scotland for the first time, thereby complicating matters and 
increasing the potential for opposition. The second factor was the very strong, organised 
opposition from both the Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland.50 The 
Attorney General, Lord Campbell, who introduced the first pair of bills, complained 
that ‘both these measures had been greatly misunderstood or greatly misrepresented in 
Scotland’ and stated that ‘he was utterly unable to understand and to account for the 
number of petitions [largely from Church of Scotland and Free Church presbyteries] 
which had been presented against the present Bills from the northern part of the 
kingdom’.51  As a result of the failure of these interdependent bills, civil registration 
                                                        
46 Marriage in Scotland was not the only way of avoiding the requirement of parental consent: under 
the Clandestine Marriages Act 1753 it was only marriages by licence that needed positive parental 
consent, while marriages by banns were valid in the absence of parental dissent. After 1823, lack of 
parental consent ceased to be a basis for invalidating a marriage, even if the parties had knowingly and 
wilfully married without it. When new modes of marrying were introduced by the Marriage Act 1836 
similar provisions were included: see R Probert, ‘Parental Responsibility and Children’s Partnership 
Choices’ in R Probert, S Gilmore and J Herring (eds) Responsible Parents and Parental Responsibility 
(Hart, 2009).      
47 Assuming that they had capacity to marry by the lex loci domicilii, ie English law. 
48 In the event of a dispute over a purported marriage, proof required either ‘writ’ (that is a written 
document) or ‘oath’ that is the other party would be required to confirm or deny, on oath before God, 
whether they had consented to marriage.  One method of securing written evidence was for the parties 
to present themselves to the local court and admit that they had entered into a clandestine marriage, pay 
the nominal fine and hold the court papers as proof, see Clive, n 41 above, 10. 
49 B Dempsey ‘The Marriage (Scotland) Bill 1755’ in H MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VI (The Stair 
Society, vol 54, 2009). 
50 There is very little commentary on the attempts to abolish irregular marriage in the 1840s but for 
some brief references see KM Boyd Scottish Church Attitudes to Sex, Marriage and the Family 1850-
1914 (John Donald, 1980), 52.  
51 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates (3rd Series), vol 100, col 568. 
was not introduced until 1855, almost two decades after its advent in England and 
Wales.52   
A further consequence was that ‘runaways’ from south of the border could continue to 
make use of the facility of Scottish irregular marriage at a time when improvements in 
travel made the journey less arduous and a realistic option for English couples living 
farther from the Scottish border. To counter this, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856 
(usually known as Lord Brougham’s Act) was passed to put an end to such impulsive 
matches by stipulating that:  
‘no irregular marriage contracted in Scotland by declaration, acknowledgment, 
or ceremony, shall be valid unless one of the parties had at the date thereof his 
or her usual place of residence there, or had lived in Scotland for twenty-one 
days next preceding such marriage.’53 
Reliable numbers of irregular marriages are impossible to establish and while there 
appeared to be something of a ‘fad’ for Scots irregular marriages among English 
couples in consequence of the restrictions within the 1753 Hardwicke Act and again in 
the early decades of the 20th century, the numbers of such marriages is likely to have 
been very small.54  
In his evidence to the Committee, James Stark, Superintendent of Statistics and 
Assistant Census Commissioner for Scotland, was of the view that most irregular 
marriage was between Scottish couples who were unable to access regular marriage 
due to changing sectarian restrictions on which Protestant denominations were 
recognised as being able to conduct marriage.55 This issue was settled by the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1834 which provided that clergy of any denomination could celebrate a 
                                                        
52 Registration of Births, Deaths, and Marriages (Scotland) Act 1854, 17 & 18 Vict c 80. Civil marriage 
was not to be introduced in Scotland until as late as 1940 with marriage de praesenti and subsequente 
copula being abolished at the same time: Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939, s 1 and s 5 respectively.  No 
claim to be married by cohabitation with habit and repute can now be raised based on cohabitation that 
commenced after 4 May 2006: Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 3. This is subject to a very narrow 
exception where Scots domiciled parties undergo a marriage ceremony furth – ie outside – of Scotland 
which ceremony is subsequently found to have been invalid under the law of the place where the 
purported marriage was entered into: s 3(4). Proclamation of banns as the alternative to notice given to 
the registrar remained the exclusive privilege of the Church of Scotland until the abolition of that 
process by s 3 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
53 Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856, s 1. 
54 Gordon, n 2 above, 511. 
55 Report, Evidence of Dr James Stark, Appendix, 3.  See also Clive, n 41 above, 56. 
regular marriage, though its effect might have been limited by the fact that banns of all 
regular marriages had to be read in the parish (Church of Scotland) church.56  
Whilst no doubt giving some indication of the prevalence of irregular marriages, Stark’s 
claim that during the eighteenth century ‘regular marriages in many parishes and 
districts became the exception … that it may be safely assumed that during the whole 
of the eighteenth century, a third of the marriages in Scotland were contracted 
irregularly’ and that the numbers up to the 1834 Act remained ‘very great’57 was, as 
Gordon concludes, ‘almost certainly a guess’.58  Equally suspect at the level of precise 
detail, though again presumably reflecting a certain reality, Stark reckoned that 
following the 1834 Act, irregular marriages accounted for not more than 1 in a thousand 
marriages in Scotland.59 
The Yelverton case 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the marital misfortunes of Theresa Longworth hit the 
headlines and drew attention to the differences in marriage law across the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Theresa claimed that she had gone through two 
ceremonies of marriage with Major Yelverton and that they had subsequently lived 
together as husband and wife in Ireland, Scotland, England and France until he left her 
in April 1858. The first ceremony, Theresa stated, had taken place in Edinburgh on 13 
April 1857, by a private exchange of consent. The Major, however, denied the existence 
of this ceremony. The second ceremony claimed by Theresa had taken place on 15 
August 1857 before a Catholic priest in Killowen in Ireland. The Major acknowledged 
that this had taken place but challenged the validity of the marriage, on the basis that 
he was a Protestant at the time that it was celebrated. In June 1858, he went through a 
ceremony of marriage with another woman in Edinburgh, and a decade’s-worth of 
litigation began. 
                                                        
56 4 & 5 Will 4 c 28.  As noted above, broadly similar legislation would be enacted in England in 1836 
and in Ireland in 1844. 
57 Report, Evidence of Dr James Stark, Appendix, 3. 
58 Gordon, n 2 above, 511. 
59 Report, Evidence of Dr James Stark, Appendix, 3. 
Each sought to litigate the issue of whether they were married to each other in almost 
every court in England, Scotland and Ireland. He was initially arrested for bigamy,60 
but the prosecution was subsequently abandoned.61 She instituted a suit in the new 
Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in England, seeking a decree of restitution 
of conjugal rights, but the court held that as Major Yelverton was not domiciled in 
England – and that if she was his wife, neither was she – it did not have jurisdiction to 
entertain her suit.62 Meanwhile, she had also instituted proceedings in Scotland seeking 
a declaration that they were lawfully married; he in return sought a declaration that he 
was free of any marriage with her. At the same time there were proceedings before the 
Court of Common Pleas in Dublin.63  
Under Irish law, even circumstantial evidence that someone had professed 
Protestantism within 12 months prior to a marriage was enough to invalidate a marriage 
carried out by a Catholic priest.64  Yet, in July 1862, the verdict of the Irish court went 
against the Major when the Irish jury returned a perverse verdict that the Major was a 
Catholic at the time of his marriage in Ireland, and affirmed both the Scottish and Irish 
marriages. 65  Media coverage of the Yelverton case was extensive. 66  Irish papers 
portrayed Longworth as an innocent victim of an unfair imperial law.67 Her victory in 
the Irish courts was celebrated as a victory for Irish Justice and the Catholic Church.68 
The resulting publicity, and a subsequent high profile bigamy case, 69  changed 
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Parliamentary debate,70 reframing the existing legislation as a discriminatory measure 
against Catholics rather than a protective measure for Protestants.  
In Scotland, however, the court of first instance, the Outer House of the Court of 
Session, decided in the Major’s favour on the basis that there had been no such 
ceremony in Scotland as Theresa had claimed. Theresa appealed against this decision 
and in December the Inner House reversed that decision and declared that the couple 
were married by the law of Scotland.71 The Major then appealed to the House of Lords, 
which in 1864 decided that there was insufficient evidence of a marriage having taken 
place in Scotland by words of present consent.72  
The Scottish courts did not directly address the validity of the ceremony that had taken 
place in Ireland. As Lord Westbury, the then Lord Chancellor, noted when the case 
reached the House of Lords, Theresa had been ‘content in the Court below to have it 
assumed that this ceremony did not, per se, constitute a valid marriage, and having so 
submitted, it is not competent to her to maintain a different view of the case before this 
House as a Court of Appeal.’73 She would, after all, have had to plead it as a matter of 
foreign law in order for the Scottish courts to decide whether the Irish ceremony 
constituted a legally binding marriage. Consideration was, however, given to the impact 
of that ceremony on the inferences that could be drawn from the sexual relationship 
between Theresa and the Major in deciding whether there had been a marriage by means 
of a promise to marry followed by sexual intercourse. Lord Westbury disagreed with 
the interpretation of the Lord President in the court below that the Irish ceremony broke 
any link between the promise of marriage in Scotland and the sexual relationship that 
subsequently occurred between the parties in Scotland after their return from Ireland, 
and also took the view that the sexual relationship that had taken place in Ireland could 
also be attributed to the promise in Scotland. However, Lords Chelmsford, Wensleydale 
and Kingsdown all held that there was in any case insufficient evidence of any promise 
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to marry, and that, even if there had been such a promise, the sexual intercourse that 
would transform a promise into a marriage also had to take place in Scotland. 
These divergent decisions exposed how an individual’s marital status might be different 
depending on the court deciding the case. The English ecclesiastical courts disclaimed 
jurisdiction. The Irish court held that the couple were definitely married in both Irish 
law and possibly under Scottish law as well and, by implication, that Yelverton was a 
bigamist. The Scottish courts came to different conclusions about the status of the 
Scottish marriage, while the House of Lords was divided. The case understandably 
generated a considerable outcry, and questions were asked in Parliament as to ‘whether 
the Government intended to take any steps to remedy the extraordinary contradictions 
in the marriage law of different parts of the kingdom’.74  
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
A Royal Commission was duly set up under the chairmanship of Lord Chelmsford, the 
then Lord Chancellor, with the task of considering the state and operation of the 
marriage laws in operation in different parts of the United Kingdom. The 14 
Commissioners were chosen to reflect different parts of the UK, as well as a range of 
different political and religious views. Nonetheless, the balance within the Commission 
was significant in influencing its recommendations, reception and ultimate fate, and so 
it is worth giving some consideration to its composition before analysing what it 
recommended.   
In view of the ultimate recommendations of the Report, and how it was perceived in 
Scotland and Ireland, it is significant that half of the 14 Commissioners had practised 
law in England and Wales. In addition to Lord Chelmsford, there was the Attorney 
General, Sir Roundell Palmer,75 two judges, Sir James Plaisted Wilde and Page Wood 
VC, Spencer Walpole, who had practised in the Chancery Division before embracing a 
political career,76 and Travers Twiss, who, as well as being appointed to a number of 
university chairs, had had a considerable practice in the ecclesiastical courts before their 
matrimonial and testamentary jurisdiction was transferred to new courts in 1858. The 
seventh, Sir Hugh McCalmont Cairns, had studied law in Dublin and been elected as 
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MP for Belfast but developed his practice in London, and by this time was Solicitor 
General and a Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal.77 An eighth individual, Baron 
Lyvedon, had been called to the Bar but never practised. Of these eight, four had also 
been directly involved in the Yelverton litigation. Cairns and Palmer had acted for the 
Major and Maria Theresa respectively in Yelverton v Longworth, in which Chelmsford 
had sat as a judge, and Twiss had provided assistance to the court in the 1859 suit for 
restitution of conjugal rights.  
Equally significant, however, in terms of the ultimate fate of the Report were those    
chosen to represent Scotland and Ireland. Alongside George Young, the Solicitor 
General, later elevated to the bench as Lord Young,78 and Alexander Murray Dunlop, 
an advocate, and later legal advisor to the Free Church of Scotland, was John Inglis, 
later Lord Glencorse. He was Lord Justice Clerk at the time of his appointment and 
Lord President of the Court of Session and Lord Justice-General of Scotland by the 
time the Report was published. As one biographer has noted, his reputation as ‘one of 
the great holders of that office’ was founded in large part on ‘his defence of the 
independence of Scottish jurisprudence’79 and it is therefore unsurprising that he was 
to be resistant to changing what he saw as a fundamental principle of Scots law.  
For Ireland, there was Thomas O’Hagan, one of the Justices of the Court of Common 
Pleas in Ireland.80 As a supporter of codification, his influence on the Commission’s 
desire for a unified law can be seen. There were also two politicians who had had direct 
involvement in marriage law reform. William Monsell, the Roman Catholic MP for 
Limerick, and Richard Southwell Bourke,81 the MP for Kildare, had both introduced 
bills to register Irish marriages in the 1860s and clashed with each other – and with 
Lord Cairns, their future fellow Commissioner – in so doing. Monsell had presented a 
petition signed by 27 of the Roman Catholic hierarchy82 against the 1862 bill proposed 
by Cairns, which had favoured using the infrastructure of the Poor Law as a basis for 
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registration,83 and the 1863 Bill that made it onto the statute book was colloquially 
known as Mr Monsell’s Act. They were thus all knowledgeable about Irish marriage 
law, had experienced first-hand the difficulties of legislating for Ireland, and were 
keenly aware of the tensions between the Protestant and Catholic communities and the 
importance of obtaining the approval of the Catholic hierarchy to secure the passage of 
legislation. 
In the light of the differential treatment of different religious groups in the context of 
marriage that had to a great extent precipitated the Report, it was crucial that the 
Commissioners should also reflect different denominations, and some of the 
Commissioners were particularly well known for their religious advocacy. Dunlop, for 
example, ‘was elected to the general assembly of the Church of Scotland as a 
representative elder for the presbytery of Lochcarron in Ross-shire’ and later carried 
out a similar role within Free Church assemblies.84 Monsell, later Baron Emly, was 
very aware of the tensions surrounding mixed marriages. He had been born into a 
wealthy Protestant family and married his first wife, Lady Wyndham-Quin, in 1836 in 
a parish church in Adare, Co Limerick. By 1850, however, he had converted to 
Catholicism under the influence of John Henry Cardinal Newman and as a reaction to 
the horror he saw as a resident landlord during the Irish Great Famine. This was quite 
unusual for a Protestant landowner. He subsequently took a prominent role representing 
the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland but his wife never became a Catholic.85 O’Hagan was 
also a prominent Catholic and supporter of O’Connell and of Catholic emancipation, 
who worked for fairer laws to give Catholics greater rights.86  
Having reviewed the marriage laws in operation in the different parts of the UK, the 
Commission concluded that having one uniform system would be both desirable and 
feasible. Since none of the systems in operation were regarded as ideal, reform could 
not be achieved simply by extending the laws of England and Ireland to Scotland, or 
vice versa. The Commission thus articulated a number of principles that should 
underpin a ‘sound marriage law’. First, it should be both as simple and as certain as 
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possible. Second, the State ‘should be absolutely impartial and indifferent as between 
the members of different religious denominations’.87 Third, while ‘every proper and 
reasonable facility’ should be given for celebrating marriage, the state also had a duty 
‘to discourage, and place obstacles in the way of sudden and clandestine marriages’, to 
ensure that the parties were both eligible and suitable. 
The solution that they proposed would have required a significant change in the core of 
the marriage law of Scotland.  The proposals would have seen the end of marriage based 
solely on the consent of the parties.  Whatever practical implications this might have, 
it would be a shift in the fundamental principle of more than 300 years of Scots law, 
one which, as the Committee was aware, would not be universally welcomed.  It would 
also see the introduction of the English and Irish scheme of civil marriages into 
Scotland,88 a move that was vigorously opposed by the two main Scottish churches less 
than twenty years earlier.89  Additionally, the requirement that churches be certified ‘by 
proper authority to the Registrar-General, and to be registered by him’ would surely 
have been a most unwelcome innovation in the eyes of both the Church of Scotland and 
the Free Church of Scotland.90 
For marriages in England, Wales and Ireland, the impact of the Report would have been 
less dramatic, requiring marriages to be conducted with a little less formality rather than 
imposing new requirements. It shifted the focus from the place of marriage, proposing 
instead that ‘the interchange or declaration of matrimonial consent necessary to 
constitute a legal marriage should for the future take place, in all parts of the United 
Kingdom, in the presence of a duly authorised official celebrant or witness;91 and that 
no other mode of constituting marriage should be recognised by law.’ 92  It was 
envisaged that the official in question could be either an authorised minister of religion 
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or a duly appointed civil officer. The authorisation of the former would be the 
responsibility of each religious community; 93  at the same time, state oversight of 
different religious groups would be ensured by the requirement that churches and 
chapels be certified ‘by proper authority to the Registrar-General, and to be registered 
by him.’94 This was, however, no more than a cross-check to ensure that the religious 
group in question had some degree of recognition and that ministers were anchored in 
their local community. There was to be no legal requirement that marriages be 
solemnized at any particular church or place, in a particular form,95 or with the presence 
of a civil registrar.96 
For England and Wales, perhaps the most radical suggestion of all was that any 
requirements as to the formalities preceding a marriage should be directory rather than 
mandatory. Notice would be given to the minister or civil officer who was to be 
responsible for celebrating or witnessing the marriage.97 The role of the state was to be 
reduced, with more trust being placed on personal knowledge. Thus it was 
recommended the necessary waiting period should be shortened from 21 to 15 days if 
the person giving notice was personally known to the minister or officer and the parties 
both professed themselves to be of the same religious persuasion. While the notice 
would be kept in a book that would be available for public inspection, the Commission 
did not recommend any attempt ‘at any kind of general publication’, describing the 
existing process of exhibiting notices in the register office as ‘nugatory’ and that of 
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displaying them on church or chapel doors as ‘rather offensive than useful.’98 Only if 
the parties were unknown to the person to whom notice was given was there to be the 
further precaution of requiring copies to be sent to the registrar of the district and to the 
minister of the place of worship usually attended by each of the parties. 
The proposed reforms would not only have achieved parity between different religions 
but also, at least within England and Wales, have transferred power from the state to 
religious groups. All priests and ministers, whatever their religious affiliation, would 
be able to conduct marriages in the same way as clergy of the Established Church. In 
Ireland, however, the proposals would have amounted to increased state regulation of 
Catholic marriages. State registration of Roman Catholic churches and the recognition 
of Catholic priests as duly authorized celebrants risked inflaming the same objections 
that had plagued attempts to introduce universal marriage registration in the 1860s. 
However, the Commission were careful to deny imposing ‘the name or character of 
State functionaries’ on duly authorised ministers of religion.99 Perhaps combined with 
the incentive of the promised repeal of the Irish Statutes to allow Catholic priests to 
carry out ‘mixed marriages’,100 and the placing of Catholic priests on an equal footing 
to Church of Ireland clergymen, this proposal would have been acceptable to the Irish 
hierarchy. Certainly there is nothing on the face of the Report to suggest that those most 
closely associated with the interests of Catholics in Ireland dissented from the 
proposals.  
There was, however, a powerful dissent from Lord President Inglis. More important 
than uniformity,101 he felt, was that the law of marriage ‘should be not only agreeable 
to the population at large, but should command their cordial sympathy and respect’.102 
This, he thought, was already the position in Scotland. He therefore argued that the 
‘essential principle’ that present consent alone made a marriage should be retained, not 
because it allowed marriages to be celebrated without formalities but rather because it 
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provided ‘absolute certainty that every regular marriage shall be unimpeachably 
valid.’103 Irregular marriages, on the other hand, were already rare, and should be 
discouraged further through a system of penalties.  
In addition to Lord Justice Inglis’ firm dissent to the Committee’s recommendations, 
the Committee had been presented with fundamentally conflicting views of the 
desirability of abolishing irregular marriage in Scotland.  At one extreme, James 
Anderson QC,104 who was strongly in support of abolition of irregular marriage, cited 
Lord Hailes’ oft quoted dicta in Scruton v Gray in his oral evidence:  
 
‘In a word, all the European nations, Scotland only excluded, have departed 
from the more ancient canon law, and have required the interposition either of 
Church or of State, or of both, to validate a marriage.  Thus, what was the law 
of all Europe, while Europe was barbarous, is now the law of Scotland only, 
when Europe has become civilised.’105 
 
At the other extreme was the written submission of the Free Church to the effect that: 
 
‘the present state of the law is favourable to the morality and well-being of the 
people, and that any radical change in the law affecting the constitution of the 
contract would be injurious, the Committee [of the Free Church] are convinced 
that the immorality and illegitimacy which exist in Scotland, although not in a 
greater proportion to the population than in other countries, have no connexion 
with the Marriage Law.  They believe that if an artificial formal system were 
substituted for the present law both immorality and illegitimacy would be 
increased.’106 
 
THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF THE COMMISSION 
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The Commission’s report, eventually published in September 1868, met with a 
favourable reaction from the press, both in terms of the thoroughness of the 
investigation and the substantive proposals. As The Morning Post noted, ‘nothing 
previously published on this important subject has succeeded in showing with such 
distinctness how varied in method, how complex and multiplied in particulars, how 
anomalous in application, and how inefficient and unsatisfactory are our present 
marriage laws.’ 107  The Dublin-based Freeman’s Journal and Daily Commercial 
Advertiser similarly praised the Report as ‘a most able and valuable document’,108 
although it refrained from commenting on the desirability of the reforms proposed. 
Most commentators took the view that the laws of all parts of the United Kingdom were 
in need of reform, but The Standard, reviewing the principles that the Commission had 
laid down, noted with unjustified smugness its ‘satisfaction at finding that the law of 
England, on the whole, comes pretty near to the ideal.’109 The laws of Ireland, it added, 
‘come very near our own, and there will, consequently, be little objection to their 
complete assimilation’. This was to prove overly optimistic in the light of the 
groundswell of support for the Fenian movement and attaining independence for 
Ireland.  It also rightly anticipated that the ‘more sweeping’ changes proposed to the 
law of Scotland ‘appear likely to provoke a greater amount of opposition’.110  
The opposition of the main Scottish churches to reform voiced in the Report was 
certainly echoed by at least some commentators once the Report was published. For 
example, John Boyd Kinnear, advocate and sometime political secretary to the Lord 
Advocate, stated that:  
‘For myself, having laboured as earnestly as any to promote assimilation of law 
where it is possible … I am yet obliged to say that I would far rather see the 
divergence in the marriage law maintained, with all its concomitant evils, than 
removed by the substitution in Scotland of any ensnaring legal technicalities in 
room of the broad and simple doctrine that marriage shall be as free as God has 
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made it, and shall be proved, when doubted, by any evidence which can show 
what the parties really meant.’111 
 
Correspondence in the Glasgow Herald debated the efficacy of banns in Scotland,112 
while an anonymous commentator in The Edinburgh Review also expressed concerned 
about the ‘intricate and severe’ preliminaries to marriage proposed by the Committee 
despite being overall in support of reform.113 
The Report also provided inspiration for Wilkie Collins’ 1870 novel Man and Wife,114 
which combined scathing but not always accurate criticism of both Irish and Scottish 
rules on entry into marriage and the laws denying women control over their property. 
It was, as reviewers noted, a novel with a purpose. Barely a few pages into the Prologue, 
Anne Silvester’s mother is spurned by her supposed husband on the basis that he had 
been a professing Protestant in the 12 months before their marriage, having converted 
to Catholicism only six weeks before their marriage ceremony was conducted by a 
Catholic priest in Ireland. Thirteen years later, Anne almost finds herself unwittingly 
married to her best friend’s fiancé Arnold, simply on the basis that they have passed as 
husband and wife at an inn for the sake of appearances. However, an earlier note 
scribbled by Geoffrey – the person that she was intending to meet and marry at the inn 
– establishes that she was already married to him at that time. By the time that this is 
established, Geoffrey’s villainous character has become apparent, so this is not exactly 
a happy ending. In true sensation novel fashion, the location then shifts to a deserted 
house where Geoffrey plots to murder his unwanted wife. In the event, it is Anne who 
is freed from the bonds of matrimony when Geoffrey is strangled by the landlady of the 
house, who suffered violence at the hands of her husband and recognises the same 
tendency in Geoffrey.  
Yet while, as one reviewer noted, the novel clearly intended to ‘expose the scandalous 
condition of the marriage law of Scotland’, 115  the case for reform was probably 
hindered rather than helped by the fact that Collins grossly misrepresented the ease with 
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which a marriage could be formed in Scotland. As a later commentator noted, ‘[t]he 
law of Scotland is not going about like a raging lion seeking to marry people 
unawares’.116 Even if he had got the law right, the very ingenuity of the plot – verging, 
as another reviewer commented, on ‘improbability’ in places, 117  would have 
undermined the case for reform. As The Dundee Courier & Argus noted, Collins was 
‘working out the story well, but it is very doubtful if it will have the effect of altering 
the Scotch marriage law’.118  
In Ireland, the desirability of the recommendations of the Royal Commission was short-
lived. As part of Gladstone’s mission to ‘pacify’ Ireland following Fenian revolt,119 the 
Irish Church Act 1869 120  was pushed through the House of Lords. 121   The union 
between Church and State in Ireland was dissolved, the obligation of tithes on Catholic 
farmers was removed and the Church of Ireland was partially disendowed. New 
marriage legislation was now required to re-authorize Protestant chapels and parish 
churches for the purposes of marriage. The resulting Matrimonial Causes and Marriage 
Law (Ireland) Amendment Act 1870122 also finally allowed ‘mixed marriages’ to be 
celebrated either in a Catholic Church or in an Episcopalian Church as long as notice 
was given to the registrar, the marriage took place in a religious building, and the 
ceremony took place between 8am and 2pm in the presence of two or more witnesses.123  
With this reform, the most egregious aspect of the Yelverton case had been addressed. 
Following the enactment of the 1870, Act the Catholic Church in Ireland continued to 
enjoy the freedom to regulate Catholic marriages according to its own rules while 
enjoying the same powers as the Church of Ireland to celebrate mixed marriages. This 
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was surely a better solution to the Catholic hierarchy than that suggested by the Royal 
Commission, avoiding any contact with the structures of the Protestant state.   
It is thus unsurprising that no move was made to legislate for the more fundamental 
reforms proposed by the Commission. Five years after the publication of the Report, 
Lord Chelmsford asked the new Lord Chancellor whether there was any likelihood of 
the Government introducing reform, noting the eminence of those who had served on 
the Commission, the number of persons who had given evidence or information, and 
that the ‘able and carefully prepared’124 Report was in fact entirely Selbourne’s own 
work. However, while agreeing that the issue was an important one that he hoped would 
‘one day’ be embodied in law, Selbourne refused to give any pledge ‘as to the time or 
manner in which the Government would deal with this subject, if indeed during their 
tenure of office, it would be possible to deal with it at all’.125 
THE LONGER-TERM IMPACT OF THE COMMISSION 
 
In England and Wales, the most blatant example of discrimination between different 
religious faiths – the requirement that a registrar be present at any religious marriage 
other than one conducted according to Anglican, Jewish or Quaker rites – was finally 
removed in 1898, by allowing the trustees of any place of worship that had been 
registered for marriage to nominate an authorised person to register the marriage. Since 
this person did not have to be a religious figure, or conduct the ceremony, the 1898 Act 
bore little resemblance to the scheme proposed by the Commission. 
 
In the long term, the most significant impact of the Commission was perhaps its view 
that the State should ‘associate its legislation... with the religious habits and sentiments 
of the people, and ... obtain, as far as possible, the religious sanction for the marriage 
contract’. The option of mandatory civil marriage received very cursory attention, to 
the extent that it was never even canvassed as a possible option.126  This final section 
considers whether such a proposal might have succeeded in becoming law, and the 
longer-term implications of permitting a range of religious organisations to conduct 
marriages.  
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 A proposal to introduce mandatory civil marriage would at least have had the benefit 
that it would not have been seen as imposing the law of England and Wales upon 
Scotland and Ireland. Across Europe, a number of new nation-states had adopted 
mandatory civil marriage in their new civil codes as they either asserted their 
independence or brought together formerly separate states. Thus the newly independent 
Belgium introduced civil marriage in 1830, 127  and The Netherlands, from which 
Belgium had separated, in 1838.128 Italy opted for civil marriage upon its unification in 
1865. 129  At the time of the Commission’s deliberations, German states variously 
permitted marriage according to Protestant, Catholic or civil rites, but it too introduced 
civil marriage in 1875 after its unification.130 
 
Yet despite these models for reform, there were simply not the same political 
motivations as had existed in other jurisdictions. In France, mandatory civil marriage 
had been a means of proclaiming a definite break with the past in the wake of a 
revolution. 131  In others, it formed part of a strategy for signalling the unity and 
independence of the nation, whether in bringing together formerly disparate states, 
carving out a new identity for newly separate ones, or asserting the primacy of the 
nation-state over transnational influences. Italy, for example, had prescribed civil 
marriage not only as a means of ensuring uniformity across different states but also to 
signal its ‘liberty from foreign influence and Church domination’. 132  These 
considerations simply did not have the same traction in the UK at this point in time. 
Union between first England and Scotland and then Britain and Ireland had been 
achieved without any perceived need to harmonise the legal rules applicable in different 
parts of the UK, and by the 1860s any attempts to impose a solution might well have 
tended to divide rather than unify. Nor indeed was it inevitable that countries would 
adopt civil marriage even when they had undergone political upheaval: in Greece, 
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which had gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1832, the state 
preferred to forge a partnership with the newly independent Church of Greece.133  
In any case, the slow uptake of the option of civil marriage in all of the constituent parts 
of the UK may have made the Commissioners wary of the consequences of making it 
the only option. In 1865, just 8 per cent of marriages in England and Wales were 
conducted according to civil rites, while in Ireland it was under 3.5 per cent.  Scotland, 
of course, had no official form of civil marriage at this time, and even the irregular 
marriages that were regarded as providing a substitute were rare. 134  This was not 
necessarily a bar to reform: other states had moved far more abruptly from permitting 
only religious marriages to requiring a civil rite. Nonetheless, in concluding their 
recommendations, the Commissioners noted their conviction that it was important ‘to 
interfere no further with the general sentiments and habits of the people … than is 
absolutely necessary for the purpose of constructing a safe and consistent marriage 
code’.135  
Yet the very depth of the conviction of the Commissioners that marriage should be 
linked to religious rites meant that they did not feel the need to justify this link. And 
this remains one of the key issues for marriage law today. It is accepted that linking 
marriage vows to recognition by religious communities adds to the commitment and 
adds the necessary publicity but it is difficult to articulate why, or why some other 
forms of community recognition are acceptable substitutes but others are not. Despite 
the increased popularity of civil marriage in all parts of the UK and Ireland, the option 
of marrying in a religious ceremony remains. In both Scotland and the Republic of 
Ireland, there is now the additional possibility of a non-religious belief organisation 
conducting the marriage, 136  while the rules restricting this possibility are being 
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considered by the courts in Northern Ireland and by an All-Party Parliamentary Group 
in England and Wales.137  
In thinking about how the state should regulate marriage in the twenty-first century, we 
need to think about the role played by belief organisations – religious or otherwise – a 
little more deeply in order to understand whether there is anything unique about them 
that justifies them playing a special role in the formation of marriage. For those with 
deeply-held religious beliefs it is self-evident that their expression of commitment to 
each other will only be meaningful if expressed in the form laid down by their faith. 
That faith may also be a source of guidance and inspiration during their married lives, 
whether as individuals with a particular relationship to a god or gods, as a couple with 
a shared faith, or as members of a community that supports and sustains them.  
But in an age of both religious plurality and religious scepticism, it becomes more 
challenging to come up with a concept of religion in anything but the broadest of terms 
and without making any claims to its truth. In R (ota Hodkin) v Registrar General of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages,138 Lord Toulson described religion as ‘a spiritual or non-
secular belief system’ – ie one that ‘goes beyond that which can be perceived by the 
senses or ascertained by the application of science’ – that is ‘held by a group of 
adherents, which claims to explain mankind's place in the universe and relationship 
with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives in conformity 
with the spiritual understanding associated with the belief system.’139 As a description 
of religion, this definition is both subtle and flexible; yet its use of the word ‘claims’ 
provides no justification for religious organisations playing a specific role in society. 
The European Court of Human Rights has similarly held that the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion ‘denotes views that attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance’ but that, as long as this is established, ‘the 
State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is incompatible with any power on the State’s 
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part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are 
expressed’.140  
There has, in other words, been a shift from the role played by religion and belief, from 
the institutional to the individual. This is also reflected in the way that various scholars 
have criticised the current restrictions. Cretney, for example, has suggested that couples 
may well ‘feel the need for some “numinous” element’141 to their marriage, while 
Eekelaar has noted the importance of ensuring that a marriage is ‘brought about in a 
manner in accordance with a deeply held belief, or in a way that holds strong meaning 
for them’.142 But once we justify according weight to a belief system because of its 
meaning to the parties themselves, is it logical to continue to regulate the celebration of 
marriages through organisations? Perhaps the focus of reform should instead be upon 
finding a pared-down framework that enables couples to marry in any form they chose 
as long as the state is informed of their intention to marry and the fact that they have 
done so.   
 
CONCLUSION 
As Gillian Douglas has noted, all societies have rules governing entry into and exit 
from marriage, ‘and the question of who has the power to set and apply these rules has 
always been the subject of dispute’.143 The Commission accepted the state’s right to set 
the rules and the need for an officiant of some kind to be present. At the same time, it 
accepted that the decision as to who should be appointed to officiate could be delegated 
to religious groups, and that all religions should be treated the same across the United 
Kingdom. That this should have been its focus was understandable, given the way in 
which religious and jurisdictional differences were at the heart of the Irish marriage in 
the Yelverton case and the tensions between different religions at the time.  
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We can thus identify three legacies from the Royal Commission that continue to dog 
the question of reform. First, there is the perceived need for marriages to have some 
public element. Second, there is the acceptance, for reasons that are never clearly 
articulated, that religious bodies are appropriate to carry out that public element. And 
third, there is the tension between the rhetoric of religious equality and the fear that 
religion may in some cases be used as a cloak for various unacceptable purposes, 
whether clandestine marriages in the nineteenth century or coercion and immigration 
fraud in the twenty-first. While it is far from our intention here to downplay the 
importance of belief or to suggest that religious organisations should no longer be 
involved in the ‘co-production’ of marriage,144 we do need to question what it is about 
public affirmation by a close-knit community – or, in its absence, the state – that makes 
a marriage. This articulation was certainly missing in the recent Irish reforms,145 while 
Scotland has yet to set out the qualifying requirements for religious and belief bodies 
beyond requiring that they must ‘meet regularly’.146 England and Wales may yet have 
the opportunity to lead the debate on these issues in devising a marriage law fit for the 
twenty-first century.  
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